To Do List
period_half.The object sessDat has data from all 6 sessions.
0 is the settings player.loc and player.price the subject was initialized at.21 is the player.price the subject would be at if the period continued.Variables in sessDat
session.codeparticipant.code is a unique subject identifyer.player.period_numberplayer.subperiod_numberperiod_half either “First Half” or “Second Half”. NA if period 0 or 21.player.loc locationplayer.price priceplayer.boundary_lo and player.boundary_hi are the high and low boundary for this player currentlygroup_size number of players in the groupgroup_size_str a string for the group sizeplayer.transport_cost shopping cost, 0.10, 0.25, 0.40, 0.60player.mc mill cost, 0.05, 0.15, 0.25player.rp reserve price, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0score_subperiod this player’s current scorescore_total currency period’s total score for this player.Summary of sessions and subjects.
| Number of Players | Sessions | Subjects | Periods Per Session |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four Player | 3 | 72 | 15 |
| Two Player | 3 | 48 | 15 |
Sessions were run at the New York University Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates with undergraduate students between Oct 17 and Oct 19th, 2017.
Subjects earned on average $84.25 from the experiment. After a 30 AED show-up fee and rounding up to the 5 AED, subjects walked away on average with $114.25
The experiment was conducted with oTree (Citation: Chen, D.L., Schonger, M., Wickens, C., 2016. oTree - An open-source platform for laboratory, online and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, vol 9: 88-97) subjects were recruited with hroot (Citation: Bock, Olaf, Ingmar Baetge & Andreas Nicklisch (2014). hroot – Hamburg registration and organization online tool. European Economic Review 71, 117-120)
Hypothesis 1. Static mark-ups will be lower in more competitive (higher N) markets.
In the plot below,
In the pilot we had a spread of transport costs from 0.1 to 1.0. Between 0.1 and 0.5 there wasn’t a huge difference in price, only at 0.75 and 1.0 did we see a substantial increase in markups. In this design we only had a spread of transport costs between 0.1 and 0.6, and we don’t see a consistent increase in price as transport costs increase.
In the plot below,
Comparing prices in both treatments. - We see with greater competition there are lower prices accross all shopping costs.
| playerNum | 0.1 | 0.25 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Four Player | 0.31 (±0.0123) | 0.23 (±0.0176) | 0.28 (±0.0117) | 0.31 (±0.024) |
| Two Player | 0.55 (±0.0263) | 0.41 (±0.039) | 0.5 (±0.0255) | 0.44 (±0.0419) |
Now, looking just at the later half of each period, subperiods 11 to 20, (remove from final)
| playerNum | 0.1 | 0.25 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Four Player | 0.31 (±0.0123) | 0.23 (±0.0176) | 0.28 (±0.0117) | 0.31 (±0.024) |
| Two Player | 0.55 (±0.0263) | 0.41 (±0.039) | 0.5 (±0.0255) | 0.44 (±0.0419) |
Strong evidence for Hypothesis 1.
Looking at the average prices within a period (all 20 subperiods) with the same player number and transport cost, there is a statistically significant difference between prices at each transport level between player number treatments.
Even comparing t = 6.0 in the four player game – the transport cost in which the four-player game with highest prices – to t = 0.25 in the two player game – in which prices were the lowest in the two-player game – the two player game has statistically significantly higher prices (p-value < 0.001).
##
## Welch Two Sample t-test
##
## data: player.price[(playerNum == "Two Player" & player.transport_cost == and player.price[(playerNum == "Four Player" & player.transport_cost == 0.25)] and 0.6)]
## t = 5.5709, df = 176.38, p-value = 9.331e-08
## alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
## 95 percent confidence interval:
## 0.06173099 0.12946116
## sample estimates:
## mean of x mean of y
## 0.4129291 0.3173331
##
## Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction
##
## data: player.price[(playerNum == "Two Player" & player.transport_cost == and player.price[(playerNum == "Four Player" & player.transport_cost == 0.25)] and 0.6)]
## W = 12880, p-value = 1.696e-07
## alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0
Hypothesis 2 - There is a positive relationship between shopping costs and mark-ups.
| Shopping Cost | N | Mean Price | Median Price | Standard Error | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Four Player | 0.10 | 648 | 0.312 | 0.303 | 0.005 |
| Four Player | 0.25 | 168 | 0.229 | 0.195 | 0.009 |
| Four Player | 0.40 | 576 | 0.280 | 0.260 | 0.004 |
| Four Player | 0.60 | 168 | 0.311 | 0.299 | 0.008 |
| Two Player | 0.10 | 432 | 0.547 | 0.523 | 0.008 |
| Two Player | 0.25 | 112 | 0.412 | 0.404 | 0.015 |
| Two Player | 0.40 | 384 | 0.500 | 0.482 | 0.008 |
| Two Player | 0.60 | 112 | 0.443 | 0.436 | 0.012 |
Recall there were 72 subjects in the four-player treatment and 48 subjects in the two-player treatment.
First, within the two player game, comparing prices in t = 0.1 and t = 0.6 (see below), there is to be a statistically significant difference.
There is a relationship between prices and shopping cost treatments. In higher shopping cost settings subjects tended to have higher prices.
##
## Welch Two Sample t-test
##
## data: mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.1] and mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.6]
## t = 7.0137, df = 218.42, p-value = 2.867e-11
## alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
## 95 percent confidence interval:
## 0.0748557 0.1333672
## sample estimates:
## mean of x mean of y
## 0.5472454 0.4431339
##
## Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction
##
## data: mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.1] and mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.6]
## W = 33222, p-value = 1.12e-09
## alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0
In the four-player game the relationship, at least between the lowest and highest shopping cost, does not appear stronger.
##
## Welch Two Sample t-test
##
## data: mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.1] and mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.6]
## t = 0.06797, df = 310.47, p-value = 0.9459
## alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
## 95 percent confidence interval:
## -0.01850285 0.01982693
## sample estimates:
## mean of x mean of y
## 0.3118495 0.3111875
##
## Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction
##
## data: mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.1] and mean_price[player.transport_cost == 0.6]
## W = 54802, p-value = 0.8919
## alternative hypothesis: true location shift is not equal to 0
Only looking at the first half of periods
<<<<<<< HEADHere we have a log-log model regressing prices on shopping costs, with player-number fixed effects.
\(ln(P_{ip}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \delta_{i} + \beta_2 ln(S_{ip}) + \beta_3 Period_p + \epsilon_{(ip)}\)
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = log(price) ~ playerNum + log(player.transport_cost) +
## player.period_number, data = df %>% mutate(price = price +
## 0.01))
##
## Residuals:
## Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
## -1.66267 -0.22208 0.01354 0.24857 1.05850
##
## Coefficients:
## Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept) -1.272706 0.025519 -49.873 < 2e-16 ***
## playerNumTwo Player 0.540056 0.017600 30.685 < 2e-16 ***
## log(player.transport_cost) -0.074936 0.012182 -6.151 9.45e-10 ***
## player.period_number -0.003878 0.002013 -1.926 0.0542 .
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.3658 on 1796 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.3532, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3521
## F-statistic: 326.9 on 3 and 1796 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
In this specification, the coefficient \(\beta_2\) measures the average effect of being assigned to the less competitive two-player treatment group. With \(\beta_2 = -0.056040\), a 1% increase in shopping costs leads to a -5.6% decrease in prices. This is significant.
Hypothesis 3. Mark-ups will be less responsive to changes in shopping costs in less competitive (lower N) markets.
\(ln(Price_{(i,p)}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \delta_{2p} + \beta_2 ln(ShoppingCost) + \beta_3 \delta_{i} ln(ShoppingCost) + \epsilon_{(i,p)}\)
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = log(price) ~ playerNum + log(player.transport_cost) +
## playerNum:log(player.transport_cost), data = df %>% mutate(price = price +
## 0.01))
##
## Residuals:
## Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
## -1.68752 -0.22339 0.01848 0.25154 1.05189
##
## Coefficients:
## Estimate Std. Error t value
## (Intercept) -1.26325 0.02628 -48.071
## playerNumTwo Player 0.45058 0.04155 10.844
## log(player.transport_cost) -0.04844 0.01558 -3.108
## playerNumTwo Player:log(player.transport_cost) -0.05857 0.02464 -2.377
## Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept) < 2e-16 ***
## playerNumTwo Player < 2e-16 ***
## log(player.transport_cost) 0.00191 **
## playerNumTwo Player:log(player.transport_cost) 0.01756 *
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.3656 on 1796 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.3539, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3528
## F-statistic: 327.9 on 3 and 1796 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
The coefficient \(\beta_2\) estimates that a 1% increase in shopping costs will leave to a 3.4% decrease in prices in the four-player game. The \(\beta_3\) coefficient indicates a one unit increase in shopping cost leads to a 5.9% decrease in prices in the two-player game relative to the 4-player game“.
| Dependent Var: \(ln(P_{ip})\) | Model 1 | Model 2 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| \(\delta_{i}\) (two-player) | 0.559101 | *** | 0.45058 | *** |
| (0.015870) | (0.04155) | |||
| \(ln(ShoppingCost)\) | -0.056040 | *** | -0.04844 | *** |
| (0.011023) | (0.01558) | |||
| \(\delta_{i} \cdot ln(ShoppingCost)\) | -0.05857 | * | ||
| (0.02464) | ||||
| ————————————— | —— | — | —— | — |
| N | 552 | 552 |
Hypothesis 4. Collusion will be easier to form in low shopping cost environments
Define collusion
A subject is said to be ‘colluding’ when they and their adjacent players have jointly positive profits. - In the save of the two-player game, both players’ profits are positive. In the case of the four-player game, the profits of the two players to the left and right (circle marketplace) are positive. - This poses of problem in comparing “collusion” between two and four-player games. So we should not do that. - Look at violines for bit - bi-modal splits in distribution.
| Shopping Cost | Percent of Period Joint Positive Profits | Period Group Obvservation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two Player | 0.10 | 0.3442073 | 112 |
| Two Player | 0.25 | 0.6750000 | 56 |
| Two Player | 0.40 | 0.7213235 | 112 |
| Two Player | 0.60 | 0.8921875 | 56 |
| Four Player | 0.10 | 0.2357724 | 84 |
| Four Player | 0.25 | 0.2904762 | 42 |
| Four Player | 0.40 | 0.3745098 | 84 |
| Four Player | 0.60 | 0.4791667 | 42 |
There is visually suggestive evidence that with higher shopping costs, groups are better able to collude.
Are profits higher? - Perhaps too linked to the discussion in Hypothesis 1-3.
<<<<<<< HEADTailing thing;
Compiled by Curtis Kephart, curtis.kephart@nyu.edu, with R Markdown Notebook.
<<<<<<< HEAD2018-03-04 11:22:07 GMT, America/Montreal
Some new stuff: Look at how average prices change at the threshold around the first half second half change. Begin by building an indicator for what variable is changing (rp, transpo, or millcost) and only analyze data specific to those questions, otherwise you’re mixing a lot of effects together.
Question 1, what parameters are changing in these different periods: Answer: see data table below, I’ve figured out which paramters change in certain periods.
Want to do a regression on periods where only transport costs changed and use period fixed effects to strip out the level effects of the other parameters.
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = log(player.price) ~ factor(group_size) + log(player.transport_cost) +
## factor(group_size):log(player.transport_cost) + factor(player.period_number) +
## factor(session.code) - 1, data = TranspoReg %>% mutate(player.price = player.price +
## 0.01))
##
## Residuals:
## Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
## -3.3601 -0.3933 0.0020 0.3853 1.8967
##
## Coefficients: (1 not defined because of singularities)
## Estimate Std. Error t value
## factor(group_size)2 -0.82701 0.03317 -24.932
## factor(group_size)4 -1.19191 0.03062 -38.929
## log(player.transport_cost) -0.02566 0.01699 -1.510
## factor(player.period_number)2 -0.25374 0.03245 -7.820
## factor(player.period_number)3 -0.07055 0.03277 -2.153
## factor(player.period_number)4 -0.09779 0.03230 -3.027
## factor(player.period_number)5 -0.26102 0.03239 -8.058
## factor(player.period_number)6 -0.18327 0.03245 -5.648
## factor(player.period_number)7 -0.20611 0.03245 -6.352
## factor(player.period_number)8 -0.24686 0.03273 -7.543
## factor(player.period_number)9 -0.09834 0.03336 -2.948
## factor(player.period_number)10 -0.31963 0.03273 -9.766
## factor(player.period_number)11 -0.19083 0.03277 -5.824
## factor(player.period_number)12 0.03012 0.03336 0.903
## factor(player.period_number)13 -0.20563 0.03239 -6.348
## factor(session.code)vj364csp NA NA NA
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.transport_cost) 0.18860 0.02004 9.411
## Pr(>|t|)
## factor(group_size)2 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(group_size)4 < 2e-16 ***
## log(player.transport_cost) 0.13118
## factor(player.period_number)2 5.79e-15 ***
## factor(player.period_number)3 0.03134 *
## factor(player.period_number)4 0.00247 **
## factor(player.period_number)5 8.64e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)6 1.67e-08 ***
## factor(player.period_number)7 2.21e-10 ***
## factor(player.period_number)8 4.98e-14 ***
## factor(player.period_number)9 0.00321 **
## factor(player.period_number)10 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)11 5.93e-09 ***
## factor(player.period_number)12 0.36660
## factor(player.period_number)13 2.27e-10 ***
## factor(session.code)vj364csp NA
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.transport_cost) < 2e-16 ***
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.646 on 10384 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.816, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8157
## F-statistic: 2878 on 16 and 10384 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
These results suggest that negative (insignificant) relationship between transport costs and prices in 2 player game, and positive, significant, relationship in the 4p game. These are the same results we had in the pilot study more or less.
Want to make an event study plot transpo cost changes from first to second half. Need to select periods where only transpo costs are changing and other parameters are common. Going to look at extremes (select data that has transpo cost of 0.1 in first half then 0.6 in second half with mc=0.05 and rp=1, then also collect data that has transpo costs go from 0.6 to 0.1)
Look at RP regression
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = log(player.price) ~ factor(group_size) + log(player.rp) +
## factor(group_size):log(player.rp) + factor(player.period_number) +
## factor(session.code) - 1, data = RPReg %>% mutate(player.price = player.price +
## 0.01))
##
## Residuals:
## Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
## -4.1129 -0.2488 -0.0715 0.2824 1.7160
##
## Coefficients: (1 not defined because of singularities)
## Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## factor(group_size)2 -0.80917 0.01944 -41.619 < 2e-16
## factor(group_size)4 -1.26483 0.01855 -68.192 < 2e-16
## log(player.rp) 0.15960 0.06993 2.282 0.0225
## factor(player.period_number)2 0.33373 0.02427 13.750 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)3 0.17605 0.02412 7.298 3.10e-13
## factor(player.period_number)4 -0.34158 0.02412 -14.161 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)5 0.20534 0.02424 8.470 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)6 -0.18071 0.02412 -7.491 7.29e-14
## factor(player.period_number)7 0.20579 0.02412 8.531 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)8 -0.44124 0.02412 -18.292 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)9 0.28848 0.02427 11.886 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)10 0.31357 0.02427 12.919 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)11 -0.22190 0.02412 -9.199 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)12 0.20454 0.02412 8.479 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)13 -0.17584 0.02412 -7.290 3.30e-13
## factor(player.period_number)14 0.25406 0.02412 10.532 < 2e-16
## factor(player.period_number)15 0.22987 0.02424 9.482 < 2e-16
## factor(session.code)l1xwokze NA NA NA NA
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.rp) -0.14978 0.08833 -1.696 0.0900
##
## factor(group_size)2 ***
## factor(group_size)4 ***
## log(player.rp) *
## factor(player.period_number)2 ***
## factor(player.period_number)3 ***
## factor(player.period_number)4 ***
## factor(player.period_number)5 ***
## factor(player.period_number)6 ***
## factor(player.period_number)7 ***
## factor(player.period_number)8 ***
## factor(player.period_number)9 ***
## factor(player.period_number)10 ***
## factor(player.period_number)11 ***
## factor(player.period_number)12 ***
## factor(player.period_number)13 ***
## factor(player.period_number)14 ***
## factor(player.period_number)15 ***
## factor(session.code)l1xwokze
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.rp) .
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.4824 on 11982 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.8352, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8349
## F-statistic: 3373 on 18 and 11982 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Results seem to suggest that higher reserve prices (demand) increase prices in the 2p version of the game (significant at 5%). However, combining coefficients for 2p and 4p=+0.15960-0.14978= pretty much no effect for the 4 player group. This is makes sense intuitively. The rp is the upper boundary and in the 4p game, competition takes them away from that boundary and, as a result, makes it inconsequential.
Next look at cost regression:
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = log(player.price) ~ factor(group_size) + log(player.mc) +
## factor(group_size):log(player.mc) + factor(player.period_number) +
## factor(session.code) - 1, data = mcReg %>% mutate(player.price = player.price +
## 0.01))
##
## Residuals:
## Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
## -3.4848 -0.2820 -0.0195 0.2874 1.7266
##
## Coefficients: (1 not defined because of singularities)
## Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## factor(group_size)2 -0.28442 0.03623 -7.851 4.81e-15
## factor(group_size)4 -0.45838 0.03121 -14.687 < 2e-16
## log(player.mc) 0.11824 0.01742 6.786 1.26e-11
## factor(player.period_number)4 0.05590 0.02461 2.272 0.0231
## factor(player.period_number)5 -0.11804 0.02227 -5.300 1.20e-07
## factor(player.period_number)8 -0.14401 0.02461 -5.853 5.08e-09
## factor(player.period_number)9 -0.02536 0.02227 -1.139 0.2548
## factor(player.period_number)10 -0.12463 0.02227 -5.596 2.28e-08
## factor(player.period_number)11 -0.13507 0.02461 -5.489 4.19e-08
## factor(player.period_number)12 -0.03978 0.02461 -1.617 0.1060
## factor(session.code)umllny6i NA NA NA NA
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.mc) 0.27416 0.01934 14.176 < 2e-16
##
## factor(group_size)2 ***
## factor(group_size)4 ***
## log(player.mc) ***
## factor(player.period_number)4 *
## factor(player.period_number)5 ***
## factor(player.period_number)8 ***
## factor(player.period_number)9
## factor(player.period_number)10 ***
## factor(player.period_number)11 ***
## factor(player.period_number)12
## factor(session.code)umllny6i
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.mc) ***
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.4454 on 6389 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.8618, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8616
## F-statistic: 3622 on 11 and 6389 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Again, some nice results here. Costs (the bottom boundary) seem to matter, as costs increase, prices increase. The effect is stronger for 4p, which is intuitive. 4p games are closer to the bottom threshold, so when costs jump that will impact them more than the 2p games where they are pricing at much higher levels.
Look at everything together
##
## Call:
## lm(formula = log(player.price) ~ factor(group_size) + log(player.mc) +
## log(player.rp) + log(player.transport_cost) + factor(group_size):log(player.transport_cost) +
## factor(group_size):log(player.rp) + factor(group_size):log(player.mc) +
## factor(player.period_number) + factor(session.code) - 1,
## data = AllReg %>% mutate(player.price = player.price + 0.01))
##
## Residuals:
## Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
## -4.2650 -0.2850 -0.0277 0.3158 1.8595
##
## Coefficients: (1 not defined because of singularities)
## Estimate Std. Error
## factor(group_size)2 -0.162665 0.030756
## factor(group_size)4 0.011502 0.027134
## log(player.mc) 0.139811 0.008909
## log(player.rp) 0.541063 0.069158
## log(player.transport_cost) -0.014467 0.007739
## factor(player.period_number)2 -0.176809 0.016484
## factor(player.period_number)3 -0.082827 0.015810
## factor(player.period_number)4 -0.104338 0.015617
## factor(player.period_number)5 -0.146341 0.016066
## factor(player.period_number)6 -0.108567 0.015457
## factor(player.period_number)7 -0.134229 0.015814
## factor(player.period_number)8 -0.190510 0.016198
## factor(player.period_number)9 -0.104414 0.016307
## factor(player.period_number)10 -0.192048 0.016144
## factor(player.period_number)11 -0.163511 0.015555
## factor(player.period_number)12 -0.079698 0.015718
## factor(player.period_number)13 -0.148151 0.015536
## factor(player.period_number)14 -0.077859 0.015909
## factor(player.period_number)15 -0.017004 0.015773
## factor(session.code)bu14vmv7 0.102904 0.011135
## factor(session.code)fsbo59wn 0.102459 0.009536
## factor(session.code)l1xwokze -0.175456 0.011661
## factor(session.code)umllny6i NA NA
## factor(session.code)vj364csp -0.271337 0.013488
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.transport_cost) 0.217971 0.009173
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.rp) -0.644770 0.087342
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.mc) 0.285500 0.010313
## t value Pr(>|t|)
## factor(group_size)2 -5.289 1.24e-07 ***
## factor(group_size)4 0.424 0.6716
## log(player.mc) 15.692 < 2e-16 ***
## log(player.rp) 7.824 5.27e-15 ***
## log(player.transport_cost) -1.869 0.0616 .
## factor(player.period_number)2 -10.726 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)3 -5.239 1.63e-07 ***
## factor(player.period_number)4 -6.681 2.40e-11 ***
## factor(player.period_number)5 -9.109 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)6 -7.024 2.20e-12 ***
## factor(player.period_number)7 -8.488 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)8 -11.761 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)9 -6.403 1.54e-10 ***
## factor(player.period_number)10 -11.896 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)11 -10.512 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)12 -5.070 3.99e-07 ***
## factor(player.period_number)13 -9.536 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(player.period_number)14 -4.894 9.92e-07 ***
## factor(player.period_number)15 -1.078 0.2810
## factor(session.code)bu14vmv7 9.241 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(session.code)fsbo59wn 10.745 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(session.code)l1xwokze -15.047 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(session.code)umllny6i NA NA
## factor(session.code)vj364csp -20.117 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.transport_cost) 23.761 < 2e-16 ***
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.rp) -7.382 1.59e-13 ***
## factor(group_size)4:log(player.mc) 27.683 < 2e-16 ***
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Residual standard error: 0.5352 on 35974 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.8304, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8302
## F-statistic: 6772 on 26 and 35974 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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2018-03-04 17:21:08 GMT, Europe/Berlin
>>>>>>> 0d14828082ebc70b92bc61b2b66b54bb81583301